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Abstract
We consider auctions in which the players have very limited knowledge about
their own valuations. Specifically, the only information that a Knightian player
i has about the profile of true valuations, θ∗, consists of a set of distributions,
from one of which θ∗i has been drawn.
We analyze the social-welfare performance of the VCG mechanism, for un-
restricted combinatorial auctions, when Knightian players that either
(a) choose a regret-minimizing strategy, or
(b) resort to regret minimization only to refine further their own sets of un-
dominated strategies, if needed.
We prove that this performance is very good.
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1 Introduction
In [CMZ14b] we motivate the problem of mechanism design for Knightian players,
and prove that (1) dominant-strategy mechanisms for single-good and multi-unit
auctions cannot provide good social-welfare efficiency, but (2) the second-price and
Vickrey mechanisms deliver good social-welfare performance, for these two settings,
in undominated strategies.
In this report, we prove that the VCG mechanism guarantees good social wel-
fare in the presence of Knightian players who either (a) choose a regret-minimizing
strategy, or (b) resort to regret minimization only to refine further their own sets of
undominated strategies, if needed.
2 Model
We study unrestricted combinatorial auctions, where there are n players and m dis-
tinct goods. The set of possible allocations A consists of all possible partitions A of
[m] into 1 + n subsets, A = (A0, A1, . . . , An), where A0 is the (possibly empty) set of
unassigned goods and Ai is the (possibly empty) set of goods assigned to player i.
For each player i, a valuation is a function mapping each possible subset of the
goods to a non-negative real, and the set of all possible valuations is Θi = {θi : 2[m] →
R≥0 | θi(∅) = 0}. The profile of the players’ true valuations is θ∗ = (θ∗1, . . . , θ∗n) ∈ Θ.
The set of possible outcomes is Ω
def
= A×Rn≥0. If (A,P ) ∈ Ω, we refer Pi as the price
charged to player i. We assume quasi-linear utilities. That is, the utility function Ui
of a player i maps a valuation θi and an outcome ω = (A,P ) to Ui(θi, ω)
def
= θi(Ai)−Pi.
If ω is a distribution over outcomes, we also denote by Ui(θi, ω) the expected
utility of player i.
2.1 Knightian Valuation Uncertainty
In our model, a player i’s sole information about θ∗ consists of Ki, a set of distributions
over Θi, from one of which θ
∗
i has been drawn. (The true valuations are uncorrelated.)
That is, Ki is i’s sole (and private) information about his own true valuation θ∗i .
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Furthermore, for every opponent j, i has no information (or beliefs) about θ∗j or Kj.
Given that all he cares about is his expected (quasi-linear) utility, a player i may
‘collapse’ each distribution Di ∈ Ki to its expectation Eθi∼Di [θi].1 Therefore, for
unrestricted combinatorial auctions, a mathematically equivalent formulation of the
Knightian valuation model is the following:
Definition 2.1 (Knightian valuation model). For each player i, i’s sole information
about θ∗ is a set Ki, the candidate (valuation) set of i, such that θ∗i ∈ Ki ⊂ Θi.
We refer to an element of Ki as a candidate valuation.
In Knightian valuation model, a mechanism’s performance will of course depend on
the inaccuracy of the players’ candidate sets, which we measure as follows.
Definition 2.2. The candidate set Ki of a player i is (at most) δ-approximate if, for
each subset S ⊆ [m], letting Ki(S) def= {θi(S) | θi ∈ Ki}, supKi(S)− inf Ki(S) ≤ δ.
An auction is (at most) δ-approximate if each Ki is δ-approximate.
2.2 Social Welfare, Mechanisms, and Knightian Dominance
Social welfare. The social welfare of an allocation A = (A0, A1, . . . , An), SW(A),
is defined to be
∑
i θ
∗
i (Ai); and the maximum social welfare, MSW, is defined to
be maxA∈A SW(A). (That is, SW and MSW continue to be defined relative to the
players’ true valuations θ∗i , whether or not the players know them exactly.)
More generally, the social welfare of an allocation A relative to a valuation profile
θ, SW(θ, A), is
∑
i θi(Ai); and the maximum social welfare relative to θ, MSW(θ), is
maxA∈A SW(θ, A). Thus, SW(A) = SW(θ∗, A) and MSW = MSW(θ∗).
Mechanisms and strategies. A mechanism M specifies, for each player i, a set
Si. We interchangeably refer to each member of Si as a pure strategy/action/report
of i, and similarly, a member of ∆(Si) a mixed strategy/action/report of i.
After each player i, simultaneously with his opponents, reports a strategy si in
Si, M maps the reported strategy profile s to an outcome M(s) ∈ Ω.
1Whatever the auction mechanism used, this equivalence holds for any auction where each Θi is
a convex set. In particular, this includes unrestricted combinatorial auctions of m distinct goods.
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IfM is probabilistic, thenM(s) ∈ ∆(Ω). Thus, as per our notation, Ui(θi,M(s)) def=
Eω∼M(s)[Ui(θi, ω)] for each player i.
Note that Si = Θi for the direct mechanisms in the classical setting.
The VCG mechanism. In our auctions, the VCG mechanism, denoted VCG, maps
a profile of valuations θ ∈ Θ1 × · · · ×Θn, to an outcome (A,P ), where
A ∈ arg maxA∈A SW(θ, A) and, for each player i, Pi = MSW(θ−i) −
∑
j 6=i θ(Ai).
Ties are broken by preferring subsets with smaller cardinalities.2
Knightian regret-minimizing strategies. Given a mechanism M , the (maxi-
mum) regret of a pure strategy si of a player i with candidate set Ki is
Ri(Ki, si)
def
= max
θi∈Ki
max
s−i
(
max
s′i
Ui
(
θi,M(s
′
i, s−i)
)− Ui(θi,M(si, s−i))) .
A pure strategy si is regret-minimizing among all pure strategies of a player i with
a candidate set Ki, in symbols si ∈ RMpurei (Ki), if Ri(Ki, si) ≥ Ri(Ki, s′i) for all other
pure strategies s′i of i. We let RM
pure(K)
def
= RMpure1 (K1)× · · · × RMpuren (Kn).
When allowing mixed strategies, the (expected) regret of a (possibly mixed) strat-
egy σi of a player i with candidate set Ki is
Ri(Ki, σi)
def
= max
θi∈Ki
max
s−i
(
max
s′i
Ui
(
θi,M(s
′
i, s−i)
)− Esi∼σiUi(θi,M(si, s−i))) .
We similarly define RMmixi (Ki) as the set of strategies of a player i that minimize
regret among all mixed strategies, and let RMmix(K)
def
= RMmix1 (K1)×· · ·×RMmixn (Kn).
3 Result
In δ-approximate combinatorial auctions with n players and m goods, the VCG guar-
antees social welfare ≥ MSW − 2 min{n,m}δ in pure regret-minimizing strategies:
2If giving subsets A or B ( A to player i provides the same social welfare, then the VCG will
give B to player i.
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Theorem 1. In a combinatorial Knightian auction with n players and m goods, for
all δ, all products K of δ-approximate candidate sets, all profiles θ ∈ K, and all
profiles of strategies v ∈ RMpure(K), it holds that
SW(θ,VCG(v)) ≥ MSW(θ)− 2 min{m,n}δ .
Discussion. Theorem 1 says that, in combinatorial Knightian auctions, the per-
formance of the VCG in (pure) regret minimizing strategies is very good. Moreover,
because of the result proved in [CMZ14a], the same holds for when a player resorts
to regret minimization only to refine further his own sets of undominated strategies.3
Theorem 1 is less intuitive than it seems, because in a combinatorial, Knightian,
VCG auction it is not obvious which strategies are regret-minimizing. Consider a
player i who (1) happens to know that his true valuation for some subset of the good
S lies in some interval [xS, xS + δ], and (2) chooses to play a pure, regret-minimizing
strategy vi. At first glance, it would appear that vi(S) should coincide with the center
of the interval, that is, vi(S) = xS + δ/2. In reality, however, vi(S) need not even
belong to the interval [xS, xS + δ]. Nevertheless, we prove that it cannot lie too far
from the interval.
We would like to mention that Theorem 1 continues to hold when mixed regret-
minimizing strategies are allowed, but with a worse bound. Roughly, min{n,m} is
replaced by n2 (or even n log n if the valuations are set-monotone).4
Proof. We begin by noting that, because the VCG is dominant-strategy-truthful in
the exact-valuation model, the (maximum) regret of a pure strategy vi of a player i
with candidate set Ki in the VCG mechanism becomes
Ri(Ki, vi)
def
= max
θi∈Ki
max
v−i
(
max
v′i
Ui
(
θi,VCG(v
′
i, v−i)
)− Ui(θi,VCG(vi, v−i)))
= max
θi∈Ki
max
v−i
(
Ui
(
θi,VCG(θi, v−i)
)− Ui(θi,VCG(vi, v−i))) ,
3A pure strategy si of a player i with a candidate set Ki is (weakly) undominated, in symbols
si ∈ UDi(Ki), if i does not have another (possibly mixed) strategy σi such that
(1) ∀θi ∈ Ki ∀s−i ∈ S−i EUi
(
θi,M(σi, s−i)
) ≥ Ui(θi,M(si, s−i)), and
(2) ∃θi ∈ Ki ∃s−i ∈ S−i EUi
(
θi,M(σi, s−i)
)
> Ui
(
θi,M(si, s−i)
)
.
4That is, vi(S) ≤ vi(T ) for all S ⊆ T ⊆ [m], all i, and all vi ∈ Θi.
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Moreover, by the very definition of the VCG, we have
Ui
(
θi,VCG(vi, v−i)
)
= SW
(
(θi, v−i),VCG(vi, v−i)
)−MSW(v−i) .5
Therefore in the VCG case, we can further simplify the definition of regret as follows:
Ri(Ki, vi) = max
θi∈Ki
max
v−i
(
SW
(
(θi, v−i),VCG(θi, v−i)
)− SW((θi, v−i),VCG(vi, v−i)))
= max
θi∈Ki
max
v−i
(
MSW
(
θi, v−i
)− SW((θi, v−i),VCG(vi, v−i))) . (3.1)
For each player i, each candidate set Ki ⊂ Θi, and each subset T ⊆ [m], we let
Ki(T )
def
= {θi(T )}θi∈Ki , K⊥i (T ) def= inf Ki(T ),
K>i (T )
def
= supKi(T ), K
mid
i (T )
def
= (K⊥i (T ) +K
>
i (T ))/2 .
To prove Theorem 1, we rely on two intermediate claims. The first one identifies,
for every player i, a strategy vi with regret no larger than δ.
Claim 3.1. For every player i, let v∗i (T )
def
= Kmidi (T ) for each T ⊆ [m]. Then
Ri(Ki, v
∗
i ) ≤ δ.
Proof of Claim 3.1. According to the first equality of (3.1), it suffices to show that
∀θi ∈ Ki ∀v−i, SW
(
(θi, v−i),VCG(θi, v−i)
)− SW((θi, v−i),VCG(v∗i , v−i)) ≤ δ .
Let ω1 = VCG(θi, v−i) and ω2 = VCG(v∗i , v−i).
Recall that, in a combinatorial auction, a valuation θi ∈ Θi of player i maps
subsets of [m] to R≥0. For convenience, we extend θi to map an outcome ω = (A,P )
to R≥0 as follows: θi(ω)
def
= θi(Ai).
Under this notation, we have v∗i (ω2) + v−i(ω2) ≥ v∗i (ω1) + v−i(ω1), because the
VCG maximizes social welfare relative to the strategy profile (v∗i , v−i). Using this
inequality, we deduce that
SW
(
(θi, v−i),VCG(θi, v−i)
)− SW((θi, v−i),VCG(v∗i , v−i))
=
(
θi(ω1) + v−i(ω1)
)− (θi(ω2) + v−i(ω2))
=
(
θi(ω1)− θi(ω2)
)
+
(
v−i(ω1)− v−i(ω2)
)
5This is because, suppose that the VCG mechanism picks an outcome ω = VCG(vi, v−i), allocating
player i subset Ai and others A−i. Then, i’s price is MSW(v−i) − v−i(A−i) in ω. This induces a
total utility of θi(Ai) + v−i(A−i)−MSW(v−i) = SW((θi, v−i), ω)−MSW(v−i).
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≤ (θi(ω1)− θi(ω2))+ (v∗i (ω2)− v∗i (ω1)) .
Suppose player i gets subset T1 ⊆ [m] in outcome ω1, and subset T2 ⊆ [m] in outcome
ω2. Then (
θi(ω1)− θi(ω2)
)
+
(
v∗i (ω2)− v∗i (ω1)
)
=
(
θi(T1)− v∗i (T1)
)
+
(
v∗i (T2)− θi(T2)
)
≤ K>i (T1)−Kmidi (T1) +Kmidi (T2)−K⊥i (T2)
≤ δ
2
+
δ
2
= δ . 
Let us now prove another claim.
Claim 3.2. Let vi be any strategy of player i such that Ri(Ki, vi) ≤ δ. Then:
(a) for every T ⊆ [m]:
Kmidi (T )−max
T ′⊆T
vi(T
′) ≤ δ − K
>
i (T )−K⊥i (T )
2
, and
(b) for every T ⊆ [m] such that vi(T ) > vi(T ′) for all T ′ ( T :
|vi(T )−Kmidi (T )| ≤ δ −
K>i (T )−K⊥i (T )
2
.
Proof. Since the case of T = ∅ is trivial, we assume below that T 6= ∅. We first
prove part (a).
Suppose that (a) is not true. Then, there exists T such that
Kmidi (T )−max
T ′⊆T
vi(T
′) > δ − K
>
i (T )−K⊥i (T )
2
. (3.2)
We contradict our assumption on vi by showing that Ri(Ki, vi) > δ.
To show Ri(Ki, vi) > δ, as per (3.1), we must find some v−i and some θi so that
MSW
(
θi, v−i
)− SW((θi, v−i),VCG(vi, v−i)) > δ . (3.3)
Let j be an arbitrary player other than i. We choose θi ∈ Ki such that θi(T ) =
6
K>i (T ),
6 and v−i as follows: for every S ⊆ [m]
vj(S)
def
=

H if S = T
H + ε+ maxT ′⊆T vi(T ′) if S = [m]
0 otherwise
and vk(S)
def
= 0 for every k 6∈ {i, j}.
Above, ε > 0 is some sufficiently small real number, and H is some huge real number
(that is, H is much bigger than vi(S) for any subset S).
7 It then is easy to verify that
the outcome VCG(vi, v−i) allocates ∅ to player i, and [m] to player j. Therefore,
SW
(
(θi, v−i),VCG(vi, v−i)
)
= θi(∅) + vj([m]) = H + ε+ max
T ′⊆T
vi(T
′) .
On the other hand, MSW(θi, v−i) ≥ θi(T ) + vj(T ) = K>i (T ) +H, and therefore
MSW
(
θi, v−i
)−SW((θi, v−i),VCG(vi, v−i)) ≥ (K>i (T )+H)−(H+ε+max
T ′⊆T
vi(T
′)
)
= K>i (T )− ε−max
T ′⊆T
vi(T
′) =
K>i (T )−K⊥i (T )
2
+Kmidi (T )− ε−max
T ′⊆T
vi(T
′) .
Finally, since Kmidi (T ) −maxT ′⊆T vi(T ′) is strictly greater than δ − K
>
i (T )−K⊥i (T )
2
, ac-
cording to (3.2), there exists some sufficiently small ε > 0 to make
K>i (T )−K⊥i (T )
2
+
Kmidi (T ) − ε − maxT ′⊆T vi(T ′) > δ. This proves (3.3) and concludes the proof of
Claim 3.2a.
We now prove part Claim 3.2b.
One side of Claim 3.2b is easy: that is, vi(T ) − Kmidi (T ) ≥ −(δ − K
>
i (T )−K⊥i (T )
2
).
Indeed, this inequality follows from maxT ′⊆T vi(T ′) = vi(T ) and Claim 3.2a.
To show the other side, that is, vi(T ) − Kmidi (T ) ≤ δ − K
>
i (T )−K⊥i (T )
2
, we again
proceed by contradiction. Suppose there is some T such that
vi(T )−Kmidi (T ) > δ −
K>i (T )−K⊥i (T )
2
. (3.4)
We contradict our assumption on vi by showing that Ri(Ki, vi) > δ. Similarly to case
(a), we need to find some v−i and some θi so that inequality (3.3) holds.
Let j be an arbitrary player other than i. This time, we choose θi ∈ Ki such that
6Here we have implicitly assumed that K>i (T ) = supKi(T ) = maxKi(T ), and thus we can pick
θi ∈ Ki so that θi(T ) = K>i (T ). If this is not the case, one can construct an infinite sequence
θ
(1)
i , θ
(2)
i , · · · so that θi(T ) approaches to K>i (T ), and the rest of the proof remains unchanged.
7Notice that when T = [m] we have T = ∅ and one cannot assign vj(∅) to be a nonzero number.
In that case we can choose H = 0, and the rest of the proof still goes through.
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θi(T ) = K
⊥
i (T ),
6 and choose v−i as follows: for every S ⊆ [m]
vj(S) =

H if S = T
H − ε+ vi(T ) if S = [m]
0 otherwise
and vk(S)
def
= 0 for every k 6∈ {i, j}.
Again, ε > 0 is sufficiently small, and H is huge.7 It then is easy to verify that the
outcome VCG(vi, v−i) allocates T to player i and T to player j. Therefore,
SW
(
(θi, v−i),VCG(vi, v−i)
)
= θi(T ) + vj(T ) = K
⊥
i (T ) +H .
On the other hand, MSW(θi, v−i) ≥ θi(∅) + vj([m]) = H − ε+ vi(T ). Therefore,
MSW
(
θi, v−i
)− SW((θi, v−i),VCG(vi, v−i)) ≥ (H − ε+ vi(T ))− (K⊥i (T ) +H)
= vi(T )−Kmidi (T ) +
K>i (T )−K⊥i (T )
2
− ε .
Finally, since vi(T ) − Kmidi (T ) is strictly greater than δ − K
>
i (T )−K⊥i (T )
2
according
to (3.4), there exists some sufficiently small ε > 0 to make vi(T ) − Kmidi (T ) +
K>i (T )−K⊥i (T )
2
− ε > δ. This proves (3.3) and concludes the proof of Claim 3.2b.
In sum, Claim 3.2 holds. 
Now we return to the proof of Theorem 1. Let v = (v1, . . . , vn) ∈ RMpure(K) be a
regret-minimizing pure strategy profile, and let θ ∈ K be a valuation profile.
For every player i, the strategy v∗i (i.e., the one reporting the ‘middle points’)
has a regret at most δ, owing to Claim 3.1. Since vi minimizes regret among all
his strategies, we immediately have Ri(Ki, vi) ≤ Ri(v∗i , Ki) ≤ δ. This shows that vi
satisfies the initial hypothesis of Claim 3.2.
Now, letting (A0, A1, . . . , An) be the allocation in the outcome VCG(v1, . . . , vn),
we immediately have vi(Ai) ≥ vi(T ′) for any T ′ ( Ai by the definition of the VCG.
Furthermore, by our choice of the tie-breaking rule, this inequality must be strict:
that is, vi(Ai) > vi(T
′) for any T ′ ( Ai. Therefore, letting T = Ai, T satisfies the
hypothesis in Claim 3.2b. Thus, we conclude that
∀i ∈ [n], |vi(Ai)−Kmidi (Ai)| ≤ δ −
K>i (Ai)−K⊥i (Ai)
2
≤ δ − |θi(Ai)−Kmidi (Ai)|
=⇒ |vi(Ai)− θi(Ai)| ≤ δ . (3.5)
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Notice that, if Ai = ∅, then vi(∅) = θi(∅) = 0.
Next, letting (B0, B1, . . . , Bn) be the allocation that maximizes the social welfare
under θ, we have
n∑
i=1
vi(Ai) ≥
n∑
i=1
max
T ′⊆Bi
vi(T
′) (3.6)
because the VCG maximizes social welfare relative to v = (v1, . . . , vn). Moreover,
according to Claim 3.2a we have
∀i ∈ [n], Kmidi (Bi)−max
T ′⊆Bi
vi(T
′) ≤ δ−K
>
i (Bi)−K⊥i (Bi)
2
≤ δ−|θi(Bi)−Kmidi (Bi)|
=⇒ θi(Bi)− max
T ′⊆Bi
vi(T
′) ≤ δ . (3.7)
Also notice that, if Bi = ∅, then θi(Bi) = maxT ′⊆Bi vi(T ′) = 0.
We are now ready to compute the social welfare guarantee.
SW(θ,VCG(v)) =
∑n
i=1 θi(Ai) ≥
∑n
i=1 vi(Ai)−
∑
i∈[n],Ai 6=∅ δ (using (3.5))
≥
n∑
i=1
max
T ′⊆Bi
vi(T
′)−
∑
i∈[n],Ai 6=∅
δ (using (3.6))
≥ ∑ni=1 θi(Bi)−∑i∈[n],Ai 6=∅ δ −∑i∈[n],Bi 6=∅ δ (using (3.7))
≥ MSW(θ)− 2 min{n,m}δ .
This concludes the proof of Theorem 1. 
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